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While several social, economic and financial indicators point to a growing convergence 
among European countries, striking differences still emerge in the timing of leaving home for 
adult children. In Southern countries (as Spain, Italy or Portugal) in 2001 more than 70 
percent of young adults between 18 and 34 years of age live with their parents, whereas the 
corresponding number for Northern countries (like Denmark or the UK) is well below 40 
percent. Existing literature highlights several factors explaining the different patterns in 
Europe: preferences and culture, labor market conditions, housing market as well as 
differences across the welfare states. In our work, we consider living arrangements of people 
18-34 years old from 14 European countries (ECHP). We augment the informational content 
with indicators of labor, housing and marriage markets characteristics as well as proxy for the 
welfare states and culture. We investigate how they are intertwined with gender differences 
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While several social, economic and ﬁnancial indicators point to a growing convergence
among European countries, striking diﬀerences still emerge in the timing of leaving
home for adult children. As Figure 1 illustrates, in Southern countries, such as Spain,
Italy and Greece, more than 70 percent of young adults between 18 and 34 years of
age lived with their parents in 2001,whereas the corresponding number for Northern
countries, like Denmark and Finland, was well below 40 percent.
There are several reasons for young adults to leave home and to settle in a new
living arrangement. Some of them leave home to move in with a partner, others leave
to pursue higher education, some settle in a diﬀerent area due to their job, whereas
others simply desire independence (either living alone or sharing a ﬂat with other
house-mates).
However, the existing diﬀerences across countries reﬂect the presence of cultural
characteristics related to the strength of inter-generational ties as well as economic
diﬀerences which constrain in various ways households’ choices. For instance, in
several countries young adults are more likely to attend higher education and en-
couraged to attend higher education at universities with on-campus accommodation,
while in other countries local universities are widespread and their proximity provide
strong incentives for young adults to co-reside with their parents for longer period
of time. Similar considerations regard the diﬀerent characteristics of the housing
and mortgage markets. Diﬀerent regulations across countries aﬀect the development
of mortgage markets, the availability of housing and the age at which young indi-
viduals buy their homes (see Chiuri and Jappelli, 2003). Needless to say that in
some Southern European countries employment protection legislation systems favor-
ing in job adult workers combined with a severe lack of social policies instruments
might have induced younger workers to cohabit with their parents in order to enjoy
intra-household income transfers and insure against unemployment risks.
While documenting the role of markets, public institutions and culture for each
European country, we also explore how they interrelate with gender diﬀerences as we
ﬁnd a common international pattern: young women leave home earlier than men.
A further contribution of this paper is that we can study the determinants of
youth living arrangements exploiting a large international dataset on households,
complementing its informational content with indicators of local marriage markets
and labor markets and controlling for other potential eﬀects, such as country diﬀer-
ences in ﬁnancial markets imperfections, welfare state and social values.
Some might argue that cross-country diﬀerences depend in large part on the
prevailing views of intergenerational relationships as well as, more in general, on
1cultural traits within each society. However, in this analysis, while we take into
account the diﬀerences of institutional arrangements we consider them as exogenous
in order to focus on the impact of personal, family, economic and labor market
situation of young adults on the propensity to leave home.
In what follows, in Section 2 we review various reasons why the coresidence rates
can vary across countries and above all we deal with some institutional features
of marriage markets, labor and ﬁnancial markets, welfare systems and culture. In
Section 3 we present the microeconomic data set and the characteristics of the sample.
The heart of the paper is in Sections 4 and 5, where we present our econometric
strategy and discuss the empirical estimates. We ﬁnd that personal and household
characteristics as well as institutional settings remarkably determine the choice of
coresidence patterns. Moreover, ceteris paribus, the size of their impact diﬀer with
gender. Understanding the reasons for the diﬀerences in coresidence patterns has
important policy implications. Section 6 summarizes the evidence found and draws
some policy conclusions.
2W h a t d e t e r m i n e s d i ﬀerent living arrangements?
Existing theoretical models mainly view coresidence as the result of a non-cooperative
game between parents and children. They usually assume that children value their
independence and, everything else being equal, would live on their own. However,
in case of coresidence parents and children share income, as well as housing and
domestic goods. Thus their ﬁnal optimal choice would also depend on respectively
parents and children utility levels in the outside option, i.e. the case of separate
living arrangements.
Previous theoretical and empirical research analyzed how poor institutional and
markets characteristics might lower the utility from living alone, rendering more
appealing the coresidence choice. In particular, in analyzing the living arrangements
of young adults across European countries several approaches have been proposed.
A ﬁrst line of research has focused on family income and labour market conditions.
In particular, the youth labor market conditions are important determinants of young
individuals living arrangements and various authors have emphasized the role of the
family as an insurance mechanism against employment risk (see Card and Lemieux,
2000, Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993, Fogli, 1999 and Becker, Bentolila, Fernandes
and Ichino 2005). Thus, youths would stay as a mean of obtaining the insurance
that the market would not supply them.
Both studies of Card and Lemieux (2000) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) ﬁnd
that the probability of living with parents increases when negative income shocks
2occur, as it is higher among unemployed and low-income groups in Canada and
the US. In particular, Card and Lemieux ﬁnd that poor labor market conditions
in Canada explain why the fraction of youth living with their parents has recently
increased in Canada relative to the US.
Becker et al. (2005) test whether coresidence is associated with higher job in-
security. In other words, young adults when facing income risks are more likely to
postpone irreversible choices, such as household formation. They use aggregate evi-
dence for 13 European Union member countries on co-residence rates and perceived
job insecurity and according to their estimates, for every 10 percentage-point rise
in the percentage of youths feeling that their job is insecure, the co-residence rate
increases by 1.5-1.7 percentage points. The underlining theoretical model can be
found in Fogli (2004). She shows by means of an overlapping generations model that
coresidence is the optimal solution when young adults are credit constrained and
the legislation that protects the employment of mature workers is more strict. The
results found in Becker et al. as well as in Card and Lemieux can be explained if
parents are altruistic and share income risks with their children.
The working status of parents, especially the mother’s one, appears to be an-
other important factor. In McElroy (1985) theoretical model the reservation wage
of young adults who live with their parents, and their utility as a member of their
parents’ household, decrease with their mother’s wage. Therefore, as their mother’s
wage increases, their probability of moving out increases as well. Cantó-Sánchez
and Mercader-Prats (1996) and Diaz and Guillo (2005) ﬁnd that children living in
households where both parents are working may experience low unemployment rates,
whereas those living in households where the mother is not working, or she is just a
discouraged seeker, will experience high unemployment rates.
In order to understand the determinants of youths’ home leaving decision we
need to take into account that their response to their mother’s market activity diﬀers
greatly from their response to their father’s. There might be several explanations
supporting this view. On one hand a working mother reduces the amount of goods
and services produced in the household, rendering less appealing living with parents;
on the other, her status increases the household income, providing a better insurance
to all members. Mother’s working status can also be interpreted as a proxy for
the family attitude towards women independence. A household that views women
working in the labor market favorably may support children’s early independence
(Del Boca et al. 2000, Fernandez et al. 2005, Farrè and Vella, 2007). Finally, a
working mother may serve as a role model for daughters’ labor market behavior.
Another important factor aﬀecting the cost of children leaving the parental home
h a st od ow i t ht h eh o u s i n gm a r k e t .A n a l y z i n gE u r o p e a nd a t a( t h eE u r o p e a nC o m -
3munity Household Panel), Martins and Villanueva (2006) test whether limited access
to credit markets explains why young adults live with their parents. They show that
diﬀerences in credit market imperfections within Europe can explain up to 20 per-
cent of the cross- country variance of establishing a new household. In particular,
they stress the importance of access to housing in order to leave the parental home.
Similar results emerge in individual countries research. Ermisch (1999) for the UK,
Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (2002) for Spain and Giannelli and Monfardini
(2003) for Italy.
However economic constraints are not the only explanations for the diﬀerent
living arrangements. Cultural diﬀerences characterizing the relationship between
parents and children are also important. Giuliano (2006) starts from the recognition
that until the ‘70s Northern and Southern European countries had similar coresi-
dence patterns, but it changed remarkably afterwards. She tests the hypothesis that
the sexual revolution of the ‘70s had a diﬀerent impact on living arrangements in
Northern and Southern Europe. Due to the closer parent-child ties in the latter
countries, after the sexual revolution, Mediterranean youth can live happier in their
parents’ house, postponing marriage decisions. The test is implemented on a sam-
ple of second-generation immigrants in the US in order to disentangle the cultural
eﬀects from contemporaneous economic factors (as poor labor or housing market
conditions). The set of variables used to identify the eﬀect of Southern European
culture has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on the probability of staying at home.
Manacorda and Moretti provide additional evidence on the cultural diﬀerences
of Southern European countries using the World Value Survey data and showing
that in all countries for both parents and adult children unhappiness is associated
with coresidence except in Southern Europe. Parents in Italy and Spain seem to be
signiﬁcantly happier if their children live with them, while the opposite is true in the
United States.
Two aspects characterize the speciﬁcity of the Southern European countries: the
relative stronger family ties than in other countries and the type of welfare state
characterized by a familialistic approach with important transfers towards the older
generations and very limited direct help towards youth (Ferrera 1996). Whereas weak
ties prevail in the Northern part of Europe, strong ties are a particular characteristic
of Southern Europe. According to Reher (1998) while in the Northern Europe young
adults normally leave their parental households when they have acquired a certain
degree of maturity so as to start out their adult lives on their own, in Southern
Europe, the process of leaving the parental household tends to coincide more or less
closely with their marriage and/or a stable occupation.
Given the weakness of the welfare state, in Southern Europe employment sta-
4tus and parental income play a more relevant role compared to Northern, especially
Scandinavian countries (Aassve et al. 2001). The welfare states implicitly or ex-
plicitly favors various types of living arrangement (Pezzin et al 2005). Thus, it is
diﬃcult to disentangle between the relative importance of these aspects since they
are strongly interdependent1. A meager welfare state in the South is compensated
by strong family ties while a generous one in the North is associated with weak
intergenerational ties.
The analysis of the determinants of adult children’s coresidence with parents be-
yond mature age has several important implications. On one hand, the implication of
the delay in independence is related to the delay in cohabitation, marriage and fertil-
ity with negative eﬀect of birth rate. On the other hand it has important implications
on the economic independence of adults children in the labor market. Recent papers
examines the interactions between leaving home and entry into poverty: that is, how
far poverty entry is the result of leaving home, rather than arising from heterogene-
ity or selection. Aassve et al. (2006) estimate the eﬀect of home-leaving on entry
into poverty and deprivation, with data from the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP henceforth). They ﬁn dt h a tl e a v i n gh o m ed o e sh a v eac a u s a le ﬀect on
poverty entry, particularly in Scandinavian countries.
The diﬀerences across countries allow to investigate further diﬀerences in eco-
nomic constraints, preferences and culture. By means of international comparisons,
our research focuses on how the choice of leaving the parental house of adult children
depends on personal, family as well as institutional and cultural characteristics; a
special emphasis will be given to how they are intertwined with gender diﬀerences.
2.1 Economic Framework
In this section we brieﬂy describe the economic framework underlying the decision
of leaving home that guides the empirical work that follows.
While it is of interest to model children leaving and reentering the household, in
this analysis we only consider the initial decision to leave the parents’ home. The
econometric framework we use can easily be extended to the multiple-spell case, in
which residency with the parents is viewed as an alternating renewal process, where
a period of living with the parents is followed by a spell of living alone, which may
be followed by a return to the parents’ house, and so on. Because there is little
information about return moves in our data and it is reasonable to think that it is
1Although Guiso at al. (2006) limiting the analysis to only cultural aspects, like religion and
ethnic background, that can be treated as time invariant over an individual’s life, show that culture
can aﬀect economic outcomes as well as political preferences
5not very common, we only focus on the initial move out of the parents’ home.
At each time period, the child and her parents determine a value of her staying
at the home this period, which includes the option values associated with staying
or leaving in future periods. Let this value be denoted V H
it in decision period t for
child i. In the same way, all parties jointly determine the value of the child leaving
in decision period t, V L
it , which could include the option value of returning to the
parents’ home in some point in the future. The home-leaving decision in period t
is made by comparing these choice-speciﬁc value functions. Deﬁne the diﬀerence





it ,t =1 ,2,...
The decision period in which the child actually leaves home is given by
L
∗
i =m i n
t {Dit < 0},
which is interpreted as L∗
i is the ﬁrst (decision) time t for which the diﬀerence between
staying at home and leaving away is negative. In the stochastic process literature,
the distribution of L∗, within or across individuals, is known as a ﬁrst passage time
distribution. In our conceptualization of the model, the ﬁrst passage time is deter-
mined by the distribution of the sequence {Dit}T
t=1. The determinants of Dit include
observed characteristics of the child (and parents), the decision period itself, t, and
other random variables not explicit in our heuristic derivation.
Our attention, then, is devoted to modeling the ﬁrst passage time distribution out
of the parental home. We use a proportional hazards specifcation of this distribution,
in which variables in the aging process part of the D sequence appear in the baseline
hazard λ0(t), and other observed covariates are included in the function φ(Xitβ).
In our model, the decision of living arrangements of adult children are the outcome
not only of personal and household characteristics, but also of variables related to the
characteristics of the socio-economic environment the individual and the household
face, as well as some cultural proxies.
3T h e s t a t i s t i c a l m o d e l
In order to estimate the eﬀects of individual’s, household+’s and environmental char-
acteristics on the decision to coreside we use a duration model. The econometric
speciﬁcations of the coresidence decision rule are assumed to be quasi-reduced form
representations of the optimization problem. A latent variable structure is assumed.
6L e tt h en e tv a l u eo fc o - r e s i d e n c ew i t hp a r e n t / sf o ra na d u l tc h i l di np e r i o dtb eg i v e n
by Li,c,t.D e ﬁne the variable di,c,t if the adult child cohabits with the parents and 0
otherwise and take the child’s age 18 ≤ αi,c,t ≤34 as a measure of time. Then we
have that:
di,c,t =1 ,ifL i,c,t ≥ 0
di,c,t =0 ,ifL i,c,t < 0
We specify a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model which deﬁnes the
instantaneous probability of leaving the state of coresidence, conditional on survival
to time t, with the hazard function assumed to be as follows:
λ(t | Xim,c,tβ)=λ0(t)φ(X
0β)
where is the baseline hazard, to which no particular parametrization is given,
whereas:
φ(X
0β)=e x p ( Hi,c,tβ1 + HHi,c,tβ2 + Ec,tβ3 + Ic,tβ4 + Wcβ5
In (2) Hi,c,t is a row vector containing the observed variables measuring the child
i’s human capital and gender at time t in country c; HHi,c,t is a vector of house-
hold’s characteristics at time t in country c and it includes variables such as the
number of siblings as well as the presence of grandparents, parents’ education and
the mother working status2. Ec,t is a set of variables describing the socio-economic
environment (labor market characteristics, marriage market, the degree of ﬁnancial
market development as proxied by the down payment ratio). The vector Ec,t varies
across countries and years, but is constant for all individuals surveyed in a particular
year and country. The fourth group of vectors is given by Ic,t and Wc.T h eﬁrst one
varying by country c and time t contains the youth social policy expenditure in per-
cent of total public expenditure and the proportion of the World Value sample aged
from 35 to 70 that declared independence as an important child quality. Finally the
Wc vector is a set of dummy variables, controlling for the four groups of countries.
In this model we use both individual data and data at regional and country
level to describe the environment adult children face. Since observations are not
i.i.d, due to geographical and temporal clustering we account for be seriously biased
downward. The bias of the standard errors can result in spurious ﬁndings of statistical
2We restrict the analysis to the sample of those that were coresiding at least for one wave and
follow them until they become an independent family unit.
7signiﬁcance for the aggregate variable of interest (Moulton, 1990). We correct this
bias by “clustering” the observations by individual and alternatively by region3.
Under the assumption that all regressors might have a diﬀe r e n ti m p a c to nt h el i v -
ing arrangement choice depending on the child’s gender, we then estimate separately
t h es a m em o d e lf o rm a l e sa n df e m a l e sma n df :
λ(t | X
0
im,c,tα)=λ0(t)exp(Hi,c,tα1 + HHi,c,tα2 + Ec,tα3 + Ic,tα4 + Wcα5)
λ(t | X
0
im,c,tδ)=λ0(t)exp(Hi,c,tδ1 + HHi,c,tδ2 + Ec,tδ3 + Ic,tδ4 + Wcδ5)
In particular, we are interested in comparing the coeﬃcients of parental character-
istics, labor and marriage markets, ﬁnancial markets imperfections as well as welfare
state and social values obtained from the two speciﬁcations, in order to disentangle
how each of them interplay with gender diﬀerences.




im,c,tγ)=λ0(t)exp(Hi,c,t1γ + HHi,c,tγ2 + Ec,tγ3 + Ic,tγ4 + Ccγ5)
where the vector C is a set of country dummy variables
We will estimate the model using the partial likelihod function for the Cox estima-
tor (1975) which allow to estimate the parameters without requiring simultaneous
estimation of the baseline hazard function λ0(t).Let t1<t2.... < tj are the ages at
which you observe children leaving home, in our case t1= age -18, assuming that 18
is the earliest age in which children leave home. In our sample:
t1 =1 ,t 2 =2 ,...t16 = J =1 6 , given that our sample is 18-34
R(ti): all people who haven’t exit by age tj is the risk set deﬁned all the individuals
D(ti)indices of individuals exiting at age i set of spells complete at tj










3Results from the latter case are not reported as they are similar to the ones reported below,
but can be distributed by the authors upon request.
8The estimation of β is obtained by minimizing the log partial likelihhod function
lnLp.The partial likelihood is a limited information likelihod given that the baseline
hazard λ0(t) has dropped out. However, though lnLp is not the full likelihood
functio, the estimator of β that maximizes the lnLp has been shown to be consistent
(Andersen et al 1993).
4 Data description
In our empirical analysis we use the ECHP, a longitudinal survey coordinated and
supported by EUROSTAT. The survey involves a representative sample of households
and individuals interviewed for eight years (1994-2001) in each of the 15 European
countries (Austria (from 1995), Belgium, Denmark, Finland (from 1996), France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg (1995), the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden (from 1996) and U.K).
The standardized methodology and procedure in data collection yield comparable
information across countries, making the ECHP a unique source of information for
cross-countries analyses at the European level. The aim of the survey, in fact, is
to provide comparable information on EU population, representative both at the
longitudinal and the crosswise level. The data collected cover a wide range of topics
on living conditions (income, employment, poverty and social exclusion, housing,
h e a l t h ,m i g r a t i o n ,a n do t h e rs o c i a li n d i c a t o r s ) .
The unit of analysis of the ECHP are the family and, within the households, all
individuals older than 16, even if it is possible to retrieve information (mainly demo-
graphic information) also on children under 16. The ECHP has many advantages:
it covers the whole population, including non-working persons; as a household data
set, it includes a lot of useful and harmonized information (for example number and
age of children, or marital status). Moreover, it is possible to link household-level
information to individual data so that it allows to study, for instance, the labor sup-
ply decisions of an adult child accounting for his/her own personal characteristics
but also for those of co-resident parents.
For our empirical analysis we selected fourteen countries of the dataset, repre-
sentative of the diﬀerent geographical areas of Europe4. For the fourteen countries
we consider all available waves, creating an unbalanced panel. We also selected all
households in which adult children are in the age range 18-34. The sample size is
made of 33,153 individuals repeated between 2 and 8 times, with a total of 143,492
observations.
4We excluded Sweden as it was designed as a cross- sectional sample.
9We combine them in four groups: Northern non-continental countries (the U.K.
and Ireland), Northern Continental countries (Denmark and Finland), Central-Western
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands)
and Southern countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain). The four groups of Eu-
ropean countries identify not only geographical contiguity, but also similar culture
as well as alike welfare states.
Figure 2 contains the coresidence age proﬁles computed by the Kaplan Meier sur-
vival function showing diﬀerences across countries and homogeneity within. The two
most homogenous groups are the Scandinavian countries and the Southern countries.
In Denmark and Finland, children leave the household between 18 and 22 and after
that age a very negligible proportion still cohabit with their parents. At the opposite
side of the spectrum, in the Southern countries, a very limited proportion leave the
household before the age of 22 and more than 50 percent is still there until 30.
Figure 3 illustrates gender diﬀerences in all countries, showing a similar co-
residence pattern: women leave parental house at a younger age than men. Dif-
ferences are larger in Greece and Italy, consistent with the fact that women leave
home earlier than men in part because they marry and marry younger than men.
Table 1 shows the temporal pattern of coresidence rates and the sample size by
country. While in Austria. Belgium, Greece, Ireland we see a remarkable growth in
the period we consider, in Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Portugal and Spain the
coresidence rates decline.
The distributions by educational groups and gender reported in Table 2 show
further discrepancies across countries. While in Italy, Ireland, Greece, Austria and
Belgium a greater proportion of young adults has a second level of education rel-
atively to the primary, in Portugal Spain, the UK and Denmark the proportion is
larger among youth with less than secondary level. In countries as Belgium, Den-
mark, France and Ireland a non negligible proportion of men and women is still
s t u d y i n gv a r y i n gf r o m1 0t o3 0p e r c e n t ,i nm o s tt h ep e r c e n t a g ei sn o tw o r t ht ob e
considered and above all in countries like Spain, Austria and Italy it is below 0.5.
In all countries, except for Germany and Luxembourg, the percentage of co-resident
women with a college degree is relatively higher than the one for young men.
The independent variables we use to explain adult children decision can be divided
in four main groups. The ﬁrst type regards personal characteristics: adult children’s
age, adult children’s gender and a dummy variable controlling for third educational
level (college degree and further).
The second group includes household’s characteristics: i.e. number of siblings
living in the household, presence of grandparents, mother’s education and father’s
education (deﬁned as for the children) and mother’s working status (dummy vari-
10able).
The information given by the ECHP dataset has been also augmented with ad-
ditional information taken from various statistical sources. They are referred to as
the third group of regressors. In particular, we consider a labor market indicator,
computed on the basis of annual female and male unemployment rates deﬁned at the
regional level and a proxy for the local marriage market, i.e. the local sex ratio com-
puted as the ratio between female population over total population with child’s same
age band living in the same region5 (they both are computed from the EUROSTAT
REGIO dataset, years 1994-2001). We also examine the loan to value ratio, which
measures the availability of mortgage ﬁnance by country: it refers to conventional
home-purchase loans to ﬁrst-time buyers. Even though the loan to value ratio might
have changed during a decade, we consider the average values for two decades, i.e.
the 90s and 2000s as reported in Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) and in Maclennan et al.
(1998). The country average values for the three indicators are reported in Table 3,
columns 1-3.
The forth set of variables controls for welfare states type and cultural contiguities.
While following the standard time invariant grouping of the countries considered
(Esping Andersen 1999) mimicking (not only) the various welfare state types, we
also consider an alternative and time varying measure of the country welfare state.
In particular, we include the annual youth social expenditures as percentage of total
public expenditure, computed on the basis of the OECD SOCX (2006)6.T h i sp r o x y
shows that Southern European welfare states are less oriented towards helping young
people in starting out and being economically independent compared to Scandinavian
countries.
Finally, in order to ﬁnd key indicators capturing cross country diﬀerences of so-
cial values, we use the World Values Survey, which periodically collects information
regarding individuals’ opinion and family attitudes since 1981, based on a represen-
tative sample of the whole population. We look at the percentage of the sample aged
from 35 to 70 that answered positively to the following question: “Here is a list of
qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which if any do you
consider to be really important: independence?” and we use it as an indicator of
the relative importance of children’s independence as social value in a country (see
Table 3 column 5). We select two waves (1990 and 2000) as we need both cross-
sectional and cross-temporal evidence on family attitudes to disentangle the role of
social perception from other speciﬁcc o u n t r ye ﬀects.
5If the child is a woman, the sex ratio is computed as the proportion of male population over
total population with her age band and living in the same country region.
6See note in Table 3 for a deﬁnition.
11However, we should reckon that welfare regimes are deeply intertwined with cul-
ture. As such they both cannot be taken as purely exogenous. Although potentially
relevant, we prefer not to analyze explicitly this issue, but to leave it for future work.
As a preliminary evidence we report results from a univariate analysis. Figure 4
plots the average co-residence rate by country against the loan to value ratio (LTV).
The size of the co-residence rate correlates negatively with the loan to value ratio,
that is countries with deepest mortgage markets are also those that features the
lowest coresidence level.
Figure 5 shows that in countries more oriented towards helping young people
in starting out and being economically independent, youth social expenditures (as
percentage of total public expenditure) are higher and the proportion of children
living with their parents is smaller.
The World Values Survey data show that in Southern European countries a
smaller proportion of individuals report that independence is an important child
quality. Figure 6 and 7 show that the smaller is the proportion of individuals aged
from 35 to 70 valuing independence by country, the greater the number of individuals
aged 18-34, distinct by gender, living with their parents.
4.1 Empirical results
Table 4 contains results of three diﬀerent models. Coeﬃcients are reported as hazard
ratios — i.e. as exponentiated coeﬃcients- rather than as coeﬃcients themselves;
standard errors are computed by delta method.
In Model 1 (Column 1), we estimate the impact of personal and household char-
acteristics (gender, household composition, personal and family members education
and mother working status). The estimates regarding children’s gender show that
being a young man results in a lower hazard — and therefore a longer survivor time
in co-residence- than young women. The faily size appears also to have an important
impact. The higher is the number of siblings the shorter is the time of coresidence.
Parental education (proxy for permanent income) is also important. In households
where mothers and fathers have a higher education it is less likely that adult chil-
dren co-reside. This interpretation here is twofolds: in higher educated households
potentially greater resources are available to the household which allow children to
move out earlier and a greater value attached on children independence.
We also include the occupational status of the mother. This variable can be
interpreted on one hand as additional income which increases the resources to the
household, it potentially increases family resources which can be used to subsidize
children in their choice of living independently McElroy’s (1985) and Diaz Guillo
12(2005). From a working mother point of view, in fact, it may be less important
whether the child stays at home or not given that she does not share a lot of time
with them. This would imply a positive impact on children desire of independence.
A similar implication would derive from a cultural interpretation. In fact according
to recent research, it can be also interpreted as a proxy for family culture of women’s
independence (Del Boca, Locatelli and Pasqua 2000, Fernandez et al 2005, Giuliano
2006).
On the other hand, these resources can be used to supply larger space and support
in the parental house for children prolonging their coresidence (in order to ﬁnish
schooling or achieve their preferred position in the labor market). The coeﬃcient is
mother’s work seems to support the former view against the latter. However, given
the contemporaneous relationship, there is an issue of endogeneity that has to be
taken into account. In this explorative and descriptive nature of the present research
we do not deal with this issue now.
The presence of grandparents delays the search for independence conﬁrming early
results of potential need of coresidence of adult children in order to help taking care
of the elderly (Pezzin et al. 2006).
We now turn to discuss the impact of marriage and labor markets characteristics,
as well as the degree of mortgage market imperfection (Model 2). The sex ratio
(indicator of the probability of ﬁnding a partner in a given area) has a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the hazard function, indicating that, conditional on other
characteristics, the marriage market provides a strong alternative to coresidence. In
regions with higher unemployment rate the proportional change in hazard is lower
(conﬁrming earlier results of Card and Lemieux, 2000, and Rosenzweig and Wolpin,
1993 and Becker, Bentolila, Fernandes and Ichino, 2005). The downpayment ratio
also signiﬁcantly decreases the risk of switching to other living arrangements. This
evidence is supportive of the view that mortgage market imperfections aﬀect the
choice of coresidence of adult children with parents (Martins and Villanueva, 2006).
Finally (in Model 3), we include the proxies for the welfare states and culture. The
results show that higher levels of public expenditure devoted to the youth increase the
proportional change in hazard rate, inducing a shorter stay in parental home. The
proxy we use for culture is here ineﬀective. The signiﬁc a n c eo fs o m eo ft h eW cd u m m y
v a r i a b l e si n d i c a t e st h a tt h e r eare further institutional diﬀerences not captured by the
set of indicators selected. In particular, we ﬁnd that living in Northern Continental
or Central West countries relatively to Southern countries signiﬁcantly increases the
proportional change in the hazard rate.
Given the signiﬁcance of the gender coeﬃcient we now turn to estimate separately
their survival experience. This exercise is also driven by results from the log rank test
13for equality of survivor functions: the statistic computed ((1) = 40.63) rejects the
null that the survivor functions of the two groups are the same. Table 5 reports the
coeﬃcients of the speciﬁcation (3) and (4) for males and females, respectively. The
coeﬃcients related to number of siblings and presence of grandparents have similar
signs in the two speciﬁcations, but they are larger in magnitude for females.
Parents education (proxy for income) induces a more eﬀective search for inde-
pendence and are signiﬁcant only for men. This is coherent with previous research
which reports the lower signiﬁcance of parents resources on females coresidence rates
(Aasve et al. 2001).
Mother’s work coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant in both, even the value is slightly larger
for females. In this respect, the coeﬃcient can also be interpreted as a proxy for
family culture of women ‘s independence which coherently is greater for women than
for men.
While the coeﬃcients related variables related to the labor market and to the
mortgage market are almost identical for males and females, the impact of the mar-
riage market has a slightly greater for women. For women, marriage is still one of
the most important reasons to leave the parental home and tend to marry younger
than men especially in Southern countries.
Although we ﬁnd that the measure of youth social expenditure has a relatively
stronger impact for women than for men, we instead ascertain that our indicator of
social values for independence has a signiﬁcantly stronger eﬀect on the male hazard
function than the female one, delaying their timing for independence.
The diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients of Northern and Central countries relatively
to the South are statistically signiﬁcant both for males and females which may be
interpreted with diﬀerences across groups of countries in strength of family ties as
well as in the welfare states.
Finally, as a sensitivity analysis, Table 6 reports results from the estimation of
equation (5) by group of countries, controlling for single country ﬁxed eﬀects. Al-
though most regressors conﬁrm previous results, some of them shows a bigger and
sometimes diﬀerent impact in some group of countries compared to others. In par-
ticular, higher child’s education signiﬁcantly results in a longer survivor time in
co-residence in Northern continental countries; mother working status signiﬁcantly
lowers the timing of coresidence except for Northern non continental countries, where
mother additional income allows children to achieve a better position before leaving
the nest. The presence of grand parents is relevant only in Central Western and
in Mediterranean countries, where stronger family ties are present. The sex ratio,
implicitly the marriage market, is most relevant in the Mediterranean countries. So-
cial values for children independence increases the proportional hazard function only
14in Central West countries, whereas the signiﬁcance in all country dummies, except
for the one controlling for Denmark in the group of Northern Continental countries,
shows further diﬀerences across countries not captured by previous regressors.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we provide an explorative analysis attempting to interpret the very
complex phenomenon of co-residence behavior of adult children with their family.
We have explored the relevance of several factors including age, gender, education,
family structure and institutional characteristics.
Parents’ characteristics are also important. Mothers and fathers who have a
higher education are less likely to have adult children cohabiting (increasing the
resources which allows children to move out), and the occupational status of the
mother which has a similar eﬀect. This variable can be interpreted not only as
additional income which increases the resources to the household, but also as a proxy
for family culture of women’s independence. While parents education are signiﬁcant
only for males, the coeﬃcients related to mother’s work are instead slightly larger
for females.
The presence of grandparents in the household while signiﬁcant in both equa-
tions has a larger and negative coeﬃcient in women hazard equation indicating a
persistence of traditional role.
While the variables related to the labor market is almost identical for males and
f e m a l e s ,t h ei m p a c to ft h em a r r i a g em a r k e th a sd i ﬀerent signs and magnitude. The
marriage market increases the proportional hazard change in living arrangements for
women. For women marriage is still one of the most important reasons to leave the
parental home and tend to marry younger than men especially in Southern countries.
Gender diﬀerences appear then to be an important aspect (both in the parents
education and on the diﬀerent response to marriage market conditions as well as the
diﬀerent welfare states) and need to be further explored.
Finally the greater coeﬃcient of Northern and Central countries relatively to the
South implies that the diﬀerences across countries results show that poor labor mar-
ket conditions and meager social policies are important constraints in the decisions
of young adults of leaving home. The analysis of the determinants of adult children’s
coresidence with parents beyond mature age is a crucial problem in Mediterranean
countries with several important implications on the delay in cohabitation, marriage
and fertility. Our results, though descriptive in nature, can be useful for inform-
ing policy makers regarding the importance crucial reforms in the area of the labor
15market as well as the housing market in order to make the transition to indipendent
living arrangements easier for adult children in Mediterranean countries.
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Figure 1 
Individual countries co-residence rates in 2001 
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Figure 2 





















18 22 26 30 34
age






















18 22 26 30 34
age
country = U.K. country = Ireland























18 22 26 30 34
age
country = Germany country = Netherlands
country = Belgium country = Luxembourg






















18 22 26 30 34
age
country = Italy country = Greece




Note: The figure reports the Kaplan Meier survival estimates by 14 ECHP countries, grouped 
by geographical and cultural contiguities. 
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Figure 3 




































































































































































































































































































































Note: Each graph contains the Kaplan Meier survival estimates by gender. The blue line 
describes women’s survival function by age; the red line follows men’s one. 
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Figure 4 
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Sources: ECHP all waves and Maximum LTV ratio taken from Chiuri and Jappelli (2003). 
 
Figure 5 
Average co-residence rate by country and youth social expenditure as percentage of 
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Sources: ECHP all waves and OECD SOCX database (averages 1994-2001)   24
 
Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
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Table 1  
Individual aged 18-34 living in the parental home by country and wave (in percent and 
total sample) 
Wave  Au  Be  Dk Fi Fr Ge  Gr Ir It Lu Nl Po Sp  Uk 
1994  -  36.2 19.3  -  35.6 33.4 49.8 65.3 66.5  -  24.9 62.4 63.8 24.8 
Total - 2,064  1,751 - 4,507  4,358  3,556 3,383 5,629  -  2,853 2,986 5,703 3,127 
1995  46.6 38.0 18.3  -  37.4 32.3 55.7 62.7 68.1 54.6 24.3 65.3 64.8 24.3 
Total 1,887 1,915 1,670  -  4,249 4,431 3,649 2,838 5,396 1,884 2,735 2,870 5,393 3,001 
1996  48.2 39.2 19.0 36.9 37.8 32.6 58.4 61.9 67.2 54.0 24.5 62.0 64.8 25.7 
Total 1,838 1,774 1,513 2,274 4,130 4,253 3,437 2,474 5,449 1,599 2,681 3,014 5,210 3,038 
1997  48.6 39.1 18.1 35.9 37.4 32.8 58.8 61.2 66.5 44.9 25.3 62.1 65.0 26.6 
Total 1,753 1,615 1,409 2,227 3,853 4,072 3,216 2,249 5,127 1,826 2,567 3,082 4,931 2,975 
1998  49.6 39.4 15.8 29.9 35.6 33.3 60.8 62.0 63.5 43.6 23.1 60.7 63.5 27.0 
Total 1,635 1,453 1,278 2,176 3,523 3,833 2,865 2,047 4,980 1,634 2,415 3,089 4,593 2,927 
1999  52.8 40.0 14.2 27.1 36.1 33.6 62.3 65.9 63.8 37.7 24.9 59.5 61.7 26.9 
Total 1,566 1,316 1,169 2,071 3,301 3,668 2,759 1,678 4,767 1,678 2,305 3,079 4,325 2,808 
2000  53.6 41.4 15.7 22.7 34.7 34.2 63.7 68.8 63.8 37.6 25.2 57.9 59.3 26.5 
Total 1,427 1,192 1,122 1,766 3,090 3,443 2,714 1,364 4,470 1,472 2,312 3,108 4,015 2,683 
2001  55.3 41.8 13.9 22.4 36.0 35.1 65.6 70.3 64.7 34.2 26.5 56.0 57.8 26.5 
Total 1,370 1,049 1,043 1,798 3,006 3,202 2,703 1,222 4,050 1,528 2,170 3,087 3,868 2,604 
Source: ECHP waves 1-8 
 
 
Table 2  
Adult children (individuals aged 18-34) living in the parental home by country, gender 
and educational level (in percent) 
  Education  Au  Be  Dk Fi Fr Ge  Gr Ir It Lu Nl Po Sp  Uk 
Male 
< Second 
level  31.0 20.8 52.3 38.6 27.8 45.1 33.4 28.9 43.5 46.0 69.3 71.7 43.2 39.9 
  Second level  66.9 33.0 35.2 56.5 24.9 45.9 50.5 41.3 50.9 41.7 26.6 24.0 35.9 20.8 
  Third lev.  2.0 17.1 2.1  4.6 19.7 4.5 13.0  12.6 5.3  9.8  1.6  3.8 20.8  38.4 
  Still studying  0.2 30.1  10.4 0.3 27.6 4.5  3.1 17.2 0.3  2.5  2.5  0.5  0.1  0.9 
  Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Female 
< Second 
level  42.5 19.2 49.7 49.8 22.9 47.5 20.8 20.5 34.9 49.0 71.3 58.3 32.1 38.0 
  Second level  53.9 32.7 30.1 42.9 21.1 40.5 55.5 45.7 58.1 40.9 23.4 33.4 42.1 19.7 
  Third lev.  3.1 17.5 5.4  7.2 21.1 3.6 19.4  14.8 6.8  7.4  2.3  6.9 25.7  41.0 
  Still studying  0.5 30.6  14.8 0.1 34.5 8.4  4.0 19.0 0.2  2.7  3.0  1.4  0.1  1.3 
  Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: ECHP waves 1-8 
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Table 3  
Indicators of marriage, labor and housing markets, and proxies for the welfare state and 




















Austria 49.35 3.75  80  3.47  63.4 
          
Belgium 49.22  8.40  80  6.57  36.4 
          
Denmark  49.08 8.17  80  11.71 82.8 
          
Finland 48.90  --  80  8.37  57.9 
          
France 49.53 9.45  80  9.03 25.9 
          
Germany 48.36  8.81  80  7.22  62.6 
          
Greece 48.28 7.49  75  5.86  50.6 
          
Ireland 49.41 8.30  80  14.28 47.2 
          
Italy 49.51  15.44  60  1.79  33.9 
          
Luxembourg 49.31  2.20  60  2.25  44.6 
          
Netherlands  49.14 3.92  75  10.07 52.7 
          
Portugal 49.65  3.83  80  4.64  18.1 
          
Spain 49.07  17.18 80 6.19  31.1 
          
U.K.  48.69 5.06  95  10.08 46.6 
          
Note. Average Sex Ratio computed as female population over total population in the age band 18-34, 
by country regions from REGIO dataset (EUROSTAT), 1994-2001. Average unemployment rate from 
REGIO dataset refers to the same years and country regions. Maximum Loan-To-Value ratio is drawn 
from Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) and Maclennan, Muellbauer and Stephens (1998); it refers to the 1990 
decade. Youth social expenditure as percentage of total public expenditure is from OECD SOCX 
database, it includes housing, active labor market policies and policies for other contingencies as 
income support programs; the values reported in the Table is a 1994-2001 average. The last column is 
drawn from the World Value Survey (1990 and 2000) and reports the percentage of interviewed aged 
between 35 and 70 that declared as an important child quality: independence. 
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Table 4 Results from a Cox proportional hazard model.  
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Variables      
    
D man  0.653 (0.015)***  0.602 (0.022)***  0.614 (0.023)*** 
    
N. siblings  1.064 (0.011)***  1.049 (0.013)***  1.074 (0.013)*** 
    
High educated  1.007 (0.030)  0.911 (0.032)***  1.023 (0.039) 
    
High educated mother  1.489 (0.062)***  1.320 (0.064)***  1.161 (0.057)*** 
    
High educated father  1.295 (0.046)***  1.218 (0.049)***  1.137 (0.048)*** 
    
Working mother  1.620 (0.039)***  1.468 (0.044)***  1.317 (0.042)*** 
    
D grandparent  0.106 (0.017)***  0.091 (0.018)***  0.109 (0.022)*** 
    
Sex ratio (in %)    1.055 (0.016)***  1.055 (0.017)*** 
    
Unemployment rate    0.975 (0.002)***  0.984 (0.003)*** 
    
Down payment ratio    0.954 (0.002)***  0.958 (0.003)*** 
    
Youth social       1.038 (0.009)*** 
expenditure (in %)       
Independence as child       0.998 (0.001) 
quality for parents       
D Northern non-      0.889 (0.080) 
continental countries       
D Northern Continental      4.243 (0.457)*** 
countries      
D Central West       1.903 (0.077)*** 
countries      
N. Observations  119,520  80,368  80,368 
      
Log  Likelihood  -67,402.849 -43,766.143 -43,336.194 
Note: Coefficients reported are hazard ratio. Robust standard errors in parentheses   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Table 5 Estimates of a Cox proportional hazard model by gender differences. 
Sample Men    Women 
Variables    
N. siblings  1.065 (0.019)***  1.091 (0.018)*** 
    
High educated  1.053 (0.055)  0.998 (0.053) 
    
High educated mother  1.292 (0.091)***  1.041 (0.071) 
     
High educated father  1.209 (0.075)***  1.059 (0.061) 
    
Working mother  1.291 (0.058)***  1.308 (0.058)*** 
    
D grandparent  0.134 (0.034)***  0.084 (0.027)*** 
    
Sex ratio (in %)  0.879 (0.022)***  1.167 (0.027)*** 
    
Unemployment rate  0.969 (0.005)***  0.984 (0.003)*** 
    
Down payment ratio  0.957 (0.004)***  0.961 (0.004)*** 
    
Youth social   1.031 (0.012)***  1.045 (0.012)*** 
expenditure (in %)     
Independence as child   0.990 (0.002)***  0.997 (0.002)* 
quality for parents     
D Northern non-  1.152 (0.138)  0.819 (0.107) 
continental countries     
D Northern Continental   6.404 (1.002)***  4.350 (0.668)*** 
countries    
D Central West   1.994 (0.107)***  1.909 (0.112)*** 
countries    
Observations 45,942  34,426 
    
Log Likelihood  -20,048.02  -19,832.702 
Note: Coefficients reported are hazard ratio. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   29
Table 6 Estimates of a Cox proportional hazard model by group of countries  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 







D man  0.749 (0.085)**  0.421 (0.191)*  0.522 (0.031)***  0.568 (0.040)*** 
      
N. siblings  1.081 (0.030)***  1.059 (0.033)*  1.127 (0.022)***  1.179 (0.023)*** 
      
High educated  1.119 (0.100)  0.680 (0.112)**  1.072 (0.061)  1.030 (0.050)* 
      
High educated   1.191 (0.133)  1.241 (0.120)**  1.111 (0.078)  1.206 (0.103)** 
mother      
High educated   1.295 (0.126)***  0.997 (0.095)  1.064 (0.062)  1.143 (0.074)** 
father      
Working mother  0.882 (0.078)  1.596 (0.210)***  1.254 (0.053)***  1.160 (0.067)*** 
      
D grandparent  0.493 (0.297)  0.000 (0.000)  0.052 (0.031)***  0.137 (0.031)*** 
      
Sex ratio (in %)  0.882 (0.045)**  1.110 (0.241)  1.020 (0.025)  1.107 (0.026)*** 
      
Unempl. rate  0.737 (0.021)***  0.682 (0.069)***  0.949 (0.007)***  0.969 (0.006)*** 
      
Down payment   0.948 (0.021)**  1.035 (0.018)**  0.885 (0.005)***  0.900 (0.021)*** 
Ratio      
Youth social   2.364 (0.247)***  1.672 (0.250)***  0.923 (0.018)***  2.084 (0.087)*** 
exp. (in %)      
Indep. as child   1.022 (0.018)  0.654 (0.093)***  1.021 (0.003)***  0.983 (0.006)*** 
qual. for par.      
D Ireland  0.036 (0.022)***       
D Denmark    3.344 (8.690)     
D Greece       0.008  (0.003)*** 
D Spain     0.003  (0.001)*** 
D Portugal     0.005  (0.003)*** 
D Germany    0.585  (0.071)***   
D Netherlands    1.157  (0.131)   
D Belgium    0.558  (0.044)***   
D Austria    0.108  (0.016)***   
      
Observations  9,288 2,453  29,463  39,164 
Log Likelihood  -4025.6723  -2443.7774  -17,442.853  -12,899.782  
Note: Coefficients reported are hazard ratio. Robust standard errors in parentheses     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 